“Such rape narratives typically involve “savage brutes” assailing delicate white victims, reinscribing myths of racial superiority and validation for a civilizing mission in India.” 
Over 150 years later, little has changed, for the West continues to thrive on media reports that portray Indian men as rapists:
The narrative of Indian men and Indian culture as violent and oppressive, particularly in terms of the systematic subjugation of women, was the primary frame which structured news media coverage during the period of the present study. It was consistently reported that India was home to a ‘rape culture’ or ‘rape problem’ of a magnitude unparalleled in the West. This “endemic of sexual violence and harassment” was reported by many to stem directly from the inherent “savagery” of Indian society and the propensity towards sexual violence posited as a common characteristic of Indian men. India was presented as a “hospitable terrain for backward ideas to flourish”, with these “backwards ideas” supposedly serving as the catalyst behind those instances of gang rape reported as “common place in India”, where violence against women was taken to be “embedded in India’s families”. 
While this kind of biased journalism supports a Western, chauvinistic agenda, it distorts reality. The fact remains that rape is not an exclusively or characteristically Indian problem. The actual facts about rape and its prevalence, as determined by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, tell a very different story. According to the data, India’s per capita rape reporting is 18.39 per 1 million population, which is well behind the rape capital of the world (South Africa at 1,324 per million), Sweden (at 625 per million), the United States (at 274 per million), and Germany (at 94 per million).  India is nowhere in the top 10 countries for rape prevalence and never has been. Nevertheless, the biased reporting and sensationalist, yellow journalism has perpetuated derogatory stereotypes that affect Indians and Hindus today. One painfully demeaning example was that of the Indian student who was denied an internship in 2015 at Leipzig University by a German professor who brazenly stated that,
“Unfortunately I don’t accept any Indian male students for internships. We hear a lot about the rape problem in India which I cannot support. I have many female students in my group, so I think this attitude is something I cannot support.” 
In the wake of the controversy, an Indian origin lecturer who spoke up in support of German educational opportunities nevertheless admitted that, “in Germany, after the Nirbhaya case, Indians are increasingly confronted with questions about India’s rape situation.” This shocking admission raises the question:
Why should anyone have to confront questions about crimes with which they have had no personal involvement, based solely on the fact that the perpetrators share the same cultural background as they?
In a civilized society, blame is assigned individually, not collectively. Assuming an attitude about criminal behavior based solely on one’s cultural background is the textbook definition of prejudice. Thus, Audrey Truschke’s insinuation that Hindus are collectively guilty of condoning rape, is itself an unfounded prejudice. It is precisely in this context that one can appreciate the problems with Swathi Vadlamudi’s attempt to “Hinduize” India’s rape problem, and with Audrey Truschke’s pleas for Hindus to accept such a racist “criticism” as valid.
Sītā’s objections to Rāma’s behavior were not an accusation, even implicitly, of misogyny. In the disputed text in question, Sītā twice addressed Rāma as a “hero,” circumambulated Him, and then declared her everlasting devotion to Rāma , an impartial reader will agree that this is not consistent with considering Him to be “misogynistic pig.” When Professor Robert Goldman of U.C. Berkley, whom Truschke previously referenced, denounced this “loose, colloquial translation,” it was clear that the Rutgers professor could no longer maintain the pretense of learned expertise. One might therefore have expected Truschke to experience a moment of clear insight, retract her claims, and apologize for the implicitly prejudiced belief that she was trying to normalize with the distorted translation.
But instead, she played the victim card, referencing the “avalanche of hate” she experienced on Twitter. Evidently, she expected logical and well-argued rebuttals on Twitter, a a social media forum that is not known for scholarly discussions. She then called out as a member of the “Hindu Right,” the Tampa-based, Hindu IT professional who reached out to Professor Goldman for his views on the matter. Apparently, the basis of this objection was her implicit belief that no reasonable person could disagree with her views, and thus any disagreement could only be due to right-wing political leanings. Also, we are told that this sinister member of the right-wing Hindu conspiracy should never have posted his e-mail exchange with Goldman publicly, because, “That Professor Goldman and I have different opinions on how to further succinctly encapsulate Sita’s remarks is not a cause for surprise but rather fodder for productive discourse and debate. Professor Goldman’s e-mail was a private message to an individual, and, as such, its content and tone were perhaps not well calibrated to express the view that divergent interpretations are a matter of scholarly disagreement.”
Or, in other words, he shouldn’t have done it because it embarrassed her. Professor Goldman wrote that Audrey Truschke’s “arguably failed translation” was “extremely disturbing but perhaps not unexpected,” and that her reading of the passages was “in her own highly inappropriate language.” He further characterized Truschke’s translation as “anachronistic,” “utterly vulgar,” “wildly inappropriate,” and “quite shocking.” In the 21st century, it is hard to believe that someone skilled enough to use e-mail would be unaware of the possibility that his e-mail could be forwarded or even published online. Suffice it to say that while Goldman might temper his words in public for political purposes, there is no reason to think that his words in a private exchange did not reflect his true feelings on the subject. Those words leave one to conclude that Audrey Truschke’s “productive discourse and debate” would never occur. And why should it? Her “misogynistic pig” translation was not based on a “scholarly difference of opinion.” It was simply wrong, and it contradicted the very clear statements of the original text in which Sītā continued to venerate Rāma even while she objected to His feigned cruelty.
Though she appears reluctant to admit it, Audrey Truschke glossed over the point that Sītā was not attacking Rāma as a “misogynist.” She was objecting to His indifference and arguments against taking her back :
किं मामसदृशं वाक्यमीदृशं श्रोत्रदारुणम् ।
रूक्षं श्रावयसे वीर प्राकृतः प्राकृताम् इव ॥ वा.रा. ६.११६.५ ॥
“O valiant Rāma! Why are you speaking such harsh words, which are violent to hear for me, like a common man speaking to a common woman?” (Vālmīki-Rāmāyaṇa 6.116.5) [translated by Desiraju Hanumanta Rao & K.M.K. Murthy]
Any casual reader can note that Sītā’s question was premised on the view that Rāma was not a common man, and as such, would not have been expected to speak like that. In fact, the text itself indicates that Rāma’s indifference was merely an act, one that did not reflect His true feelings on the matter :
अनन्यहृदयां भक्तां मचत्तपरिवर्तिनीम् ।
अहमप्यवगच्छामि मैथिलीं जनकात्मजाम् ॥ वा.रा. ६.११८.१५ ॥
“I also know that Sītā, the daughter of Janaka, who ever revolves in My mind, is undivided in her affection to me.” (Vālmīki-Rāmāyaṇa 6.118.15) [translated by Desiraju Hanumanta Rao & K.M.K. Murthy]
इमामपि विशालाक्षीं रक्षितां स्वेन तेजसा ।
रावणो नातिवर्तेत वेल मिव महोदधिः ॥ वा.रा. ६.११८.१६ ॥
“Rāvaṇa could not violate this wide-eyed woman, protected as she was by her own splendour, any more than an ocean would transgress its bounds.” (Vālmīki-Rāmāyaṇa 6.118.16) [translated by Desiraju Hanumanta Rao & K.M.K. Murthy]
Rāma explicitly stated that He acted the part of a cruel and doubting husband only to convince everyone else of Sītā’s devotion :
प्रत्ययार्थं तु लोकानां त्रयाणाम् सत्यसंश्रयः ।
उपेक्षे चापि वैदेहीं प्रविशन्तीं हुताशनम् ॥ वा.रा. ६.११८.१७ ॥
“In order to convince the three worlds, I, whose refugee is truth, ignored Sītā while she was entering the fire.” (Vālmīki-Rāmāyaṇa 6.118.17) [translated by Desiraju Hanumanta Rao & K.M.K. Murthy]
न च शक्तः सुदुष्टत्मा मनसापि हि मैथिलीम् ।
प्रधर्षयितुमप्राप्यां दीप्तामग्निशिखामिव ॥ वा.रा. ६.११८.१८ ॥
“The evil-minded Rāvaṇa was not able to lay his violent hands, even in thought, on the unobtainable Sītā, who was blazing like a flaming tongue of fire.” (Vālmīki-Rāmāyaṇa 6.118.18) [translated by Desiraju Hanumanta Rao & K.M.K. Murthy]
नेय मर्हति चैश्वर्यं रावणान्तःपुरे शुभा ।
अनन्या हि मया सीता भास्करेण प्रभा यथा ॥ वा.रा. ६.११८.१९ ॥
“This auspicious woman could not give way to the sovereignty, existing in the gynaecium of Rāvaṇa, in as much as Sītā is not different from me, even as sunlight is not different from the sun.” (Vālmīki-Rāmāyaṇa 6.118.19) [translated by Desiraju Hanumanta Rao & K.M.K. Murthy]
Here, critics will likely argue that Rāma’s testing of Sītā’s chastity represents an entrenched, gender-based, double-standard in Hinduism. The argument being that it was Sītā whose fidelity was being tested, and not Rāma’s. However, that unscholarly hypothesis does not stand the scrutiny of evidence. First, it was not Rāma who was kidnapped and made to sit in the home of a member of the opposite gender, threatened with violence unless He agreed to marry His captor. Second, and most importantly, Sītā’s devotion is not that of an ordinary wife to an ordinary husband, and revealing its divine, other-worldly character was the whole point of the text and of this episode in particular.
As a matter of common sense, fidelity to one’s husband does not make one immune to fire, and there is no other story in the Hindu canon in which a wife’s fidelity is depicted as being superior to the destructive effects of fire. Moreover, an ordinary, human wife cannot boast of the ability to destroy her enemies with merely a glance. Yet, this other-worldly ability was clearly expressed by Sītā in the text :
असन्देशात्तु रामस्य तपसश्चानुपालनात् ।
न त्वां कुर्मि दशग्रीव भस्म भर्मार्ह तेजसा ॥ वा.रा. ५.२२.२० ॥
“O Rāvaṇa I can reduce you to ashes through the fire of my chastity. But I do not have Rāma’s permission and I want to preserve my power of asceticism even though you are fit to be consigned to the flames.” (Vālmīki-Rāmāyaṇa 5.22.20) [translated by P. Geervani, K. Kamala, & V.V. Subba Rao]
Sītā’s grief due to separation from Rāma was real. Her nearly one year of captivity, during which she was threatened with death should she refuse to comply with Rāvaṇa’s lusty desires, would easily meet the dictionary definition of “terrorism.” But the text indicates that, despite having the ability to free herself, Sītā never considered doing so, because she did not have Rāma’s sanction to act in this way.
This kind of uncompromising dependence on one’s Lord’s wishes, even in the face of certain destruction, is not the attitude of an ordinary human woman. Rather, her devotion would be (and historically has been) understood in the broader Hindu tradition as that of a surrendered and ever-liberated devotee of Viṣṇu. That this is so is suggested in the text in several places, most notably the above verses in which Rāma states that Sītā is inseparable from Him as “sunlight is not different from the sun.” Elsewhere she is compared with Lakṣmī, in a not-so-subtle hint as to her divine identity (Sītā is commonly understood in Hinduism as an avatār of goddess Lakṣmī).  Her resistance to fire further supports the perception that she possessed a divine body, which again would be seen as the result of her pure and uncompromising devotion to the Supreme Lord.
As for Rāma Himself, there is no doubt that the text identifies Him as the Supreme Lord Nārāyaṇa Himself :
अक्षय्यं मधुहन्तारं जानामि त्वां सुरेश्वरम् ।
धनुषोऽस्य परामर्शात् स्वस्ति तेऽस्तु परंतप ॥ वा.रा. १.७६.१७ ॥
“From the fact of You having (not only) seized (but also strung and drawn) this bow (of Lord Viṣṇu, which could be strung none else) I conclude You to be (no other than) the imperishable Lord Viṣṇu (the suzerain Lord of gods), the Slayer of the demon Madhu. Let everything be well with You, O chastiser of foes!” (Vālmīki-Rāmāyaṇa 1.76.17) [translation published by Gita Press]
स हि देवैरुदीर्णस्य रावणस्य वधार्थिभिः ।
अर्थितो मानुषे लोके जज्ञे विष्णुस्सनातनः ॥ वा.रा. २.१.७ ॥
“For, entreated by the gods, seeking the destruction of the haughty Rāvaṇa, the eternal Lord Viṣṇu (Himself) was born on the mortal plane as Śrī Rāma.” (Vālmīki-Rāmāyaṇa 2.1.7) [translation published by Gita Press]
सर्वलोकेश्वरस्यैवं कृत्वा विप्रियमुत्तमम् ।
रामस्य राजसिंहस्य दुर्लभं तव जीवितम् ॥ वा.रा. ५.५१.४३ ॥
“Rāma is the supreme lord of all worlds, a lion among kings. Having pained Him it is very difficult for you to sustain your life after offending Him to this extent.” (Vālmīki-Rāmāyaṇa 5.51.43) [translated by P. Geervani, K. Kamala & V.V. Subramaniam]
अक्षरं ब्रह्म सत्यं च मध्ये चान्ते च राघव ॥ ६.११७.१४ ॥
लोकानां त्वं परो धर्मो विष्वक्सेनश्चतुर्भुजः ।
“You are the imperishable Brahman (the Absolute), the Truth abiding at the beginning, in the middle, as well as at the end (of the universe), O scion of Raghu! You are the supreme Law operating in (all) the worlds. Your forces (in the shape of Your controlling agents) are spread all round; You are the four-armed Lord (Śrī Hari).” (Vālmīki-Rāmāyaṇa 6.117.14) [translation published by Gita Press]
इदानीं च विजानामि यथा सौम्य सुरेश्वरैः ।
वधार्थं रावणस्येह विहितं पुरुषोत्तमम् ॥ वा.रा. ६.११९.१८ ॥
“I now recognize You to be the Supreme Person, duly dispatched here in disguise by the rulers of gods for the destruction of Rāvaṇa, O gentle one!” (Vālmīki-Rāmāyaṇa 6.119.18) [translation published by Gita Press]
The Vedic tradition does not consider Nārāyaṇa to be one among many other gods of equal stature. On the contrary, He is explicitly identified in the Vedas as the Supreme Entity :
सहस्रशीर्षं देवं विश्वाक्षं विश्वशम्भुवम् ।
विश्वं नारायणं देवमक्षरं परमं प्रभुम् ॥ महानारायणोपनिषद् ९० ॥
विश्वतः परमं नित्यं विश्वं नारायणँ हरिम् ।
विश्वमेवेदं पुरुषस्तद्विश्वमुपजीवति ॥ महानारायणोपनिषद् ९१ ॥
पतिं विश्वस्यात्मेश्वरँ शाश्वतँ शिवमच्युतम् ।
नारायणं महाज्ञेयं विश्वात्मानं परायणम् ॥ महानारायणोपनिषद् ९२ ॥
“The Lord Who has a thousand heads, Who has His eyes everywhere, Who works out the good of all the worlds, Who is the immutable and the Supreme Lord, Who is the bestower of the fruits of all the deeds, is Nārāyaṇa Who is all this universe. He is the most supreme and the eternal on account of His being in everything. This universe is Nārāyaṇa, Hari. All this universe is puruṣa alone. This universe lives on account of that puruṣa. Nārāyaṇa is the master of the universe. This paramātman is the ruler of Himself. He is the eternally auspicious and He is acyuta or unchanging. This Nārāyaṇa is the highest object to be known. He is the innerself of all. He is the supreme object of attainment or the highest goal.” (Mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad, Draviḍa-pāṭha, 90-92) [translated by Dr. N.S. Anantha Rangacharya]
Thus, in the culture in which the Rāmāyaṇa was told, Sītā’s uncompromising devotion to Rāma would not be regarded as merely ideal wifely behavior. Her actions would instead be seen, and indeed are still seen, as transcendent devotion to a Supreme Person Who projects, pervades, and sustains the universe, and Who is eternally pure and free from the defects seen in ordinary human beings. Thus, there was no question of misogyny in the Puruṣa who is “sivamacyutam” (unchangingly pure and auspicious), as misogyny is a form of hatred which has its roots in the guṇas of prakṛti (the contaminating modes of matter), which influence ordinary human beings but which He transcends and is unaffected by :
वेदाहमेतं पुरुषं महान्तम् । आदित्यवर्णं तमसस्तु पारे ।
सर्वाणि रूपाणि विचित्यधीरः । नामानि कृत्वाऽभिवदन् यदास्ते । तै.आ. ३.१२.७. ।
“I know the mighty Supreme Being, whose colour is like the Sun, beyond the reach of darkness. He the Omniscient One, Himself creates all the manifold forms and calls them by various names.” (Taittirīya Āraṇyaka 3.12.7) [translated by Rama Ramanuja Achari]
For the author to identify Rāma as Nārāyana further supports the premise that neither His actions, His devotion, nor even His devotees can be correctly judged by ordinary human standards. Their actions have to be understood as divine acts, unconditioned by the typical human failings of anger, passion, and ignorance. Thus, to a Hindu, any insinuation of impure motives in Rāma would be seen at best as childish ignorance of His divine status as revealed in the text, or worse, as an unforgivably deliberate, calculated attempt to distort the text by ignoring the underlying religious assumptions upon which it is based.
Obviously trying to skirt this issue, Truschke alluded to “pre-modern and modern thinkers who have offered harsh assessments of Rama and his behavior,” along with the “widely accepted scholarly (meaning, non-Hindu scholars in academia) view that the deification of Rama is a rather late development in the Ramayana tradition and not original to the core of Valmiki’s text.” But this line of argument is short-sighted and self-defeating. If she wants to argue that Hindus inherited a misogynistic attitude from the Rāmāyaṇa, then it logically follows that the discussion must focus on how Hindus actually understood the Rāmāyaṇa. The fact of the matter is that Rāma was always understood to be an avatāra of Viṣṇu, and there is no evidence of an ancient Hindu tradition in which He was remembered merely as a great human subject to the influence of the guṇas of prakṛti. There is no manuscript of the Rāmāyaṇa, scientifically validated as to its antiquity, which lacks the multiple ślokas attesting to Rāma’s supremacy. Truschke therefore has to decide which angle she wants to argue. Either she can discuss the Rāmāyaṇa as Hindus understood it – as a text about the avatār of the Supreme Person who is free from all faults, or she can discuss the academic view of the story as that of an extraordinary human figure. She cannot have it both ways by arguing that Rāma is incorrectly regarded by Hindus as a Supreme Person free of all faults, and yet Hindus would interpret His actions as those of a human being subject to the conditioning of matter.
In suggesting that Rāma was seen as a misogynist, Audrey Truschke, for all of her scholarly credentials, has offered nothing of value in understanding the Rāmāyaṇa as it was written, nor as it was understood by Hindus for centuries. She deliberately glossed over the Rāmāyaṇa’s treatment of Rāma as a Supreme Being free of impure motives, ignored the significance of Sītā’s uncompromising devotion to Him, resurrected an ugly colonial stereotype of Hindus as having a rape culture, and unconvincingly tried to pin this stereotype on a false “misogyny” narrative that is not supported by the text itself. Hindus have a long history of regarding Rāma as a Supreme Person unaffected by the kind of behaviors that are subject to influence by rājo-guṇa and tamo-guṇa.
It is unfortunate that His critics cannot make the same claim about themselves.
 “Unspeakable Outrages and Unbearable Defilements: Rape Narratives in the Literature of Colonial India” Pamela Lothspeich. Michigan State University.
 “The Racialisation of Rape Narratives in British Media Coverage of the Delhi Rape.” Scarlett Cockerill, Jan 5 2016.
 “German professor cites India’s ‘rape problem’ in rejection of Indian applicant.” Abby Phillip, The Washington Post, March 9, 2015.